In 2001, Indonesia instituted new laws that devolved many functions and responsibilities from central government to the district level. After decades of centralized control of economic and political development, control was shifted to more than 360 district and municipal governments, putting them in charge of managing all affairs of state, excluding foreign and monetary policy, religion and security. Thorburn discusses in this article his perceptions of how these drastic changes are affecting natural resource management. Despite the long promoted benefits of decentralization in regards to natural resource management, the author states that even within six months of these changes in Indonesia there were disturbing trends and problems arising.

Prior to these governmental changes, thirty-two years of “no hold barred” development between 1966 -1998 exacted a heavy toll on the country’s ecological resources and weakened many indigenous cultural institutions that mediated access to and use of local resources. Thorburn believes the recent changes signal a monumental shift in the management of these resources, with profound implications for the rights and roles of local communities in this management. Environmental organizations and NGOs have been quiet during this period of change and the wavering of long held traditional system of resource management, known as adat, appears to be drowned out by the larger political implications of the governmental changes. While decentralization, community participation and sustainability are often spoken of together in resource management literature, the author stresses that these are not the same thing nor are there inherent positive linkages between one and the other. Trends since the recent governmental changes indicate that decentralization does not, in and of itself, necessarily produce a more conducive environment for community empowerment. In Indonesia there is concern that decentralization might lead to a more exploitative, inegalitarian, and environmentally harmful system than before.

To make this point, Thorburn discusses three points that are contributing to the concerns for the future and sustainability of Indonesia’s natural resources. First, local power is still concentrated in the hands of small hereditary elite, who with few checks and balances have taken hold of the new localized power to create authoritarian “states within a state”. With hundreds of these throughout Indonesia it is impossible to control this elite from using the natural resources in the most lucrative fashion. Secondly, Indonesia is extremely ethnically diverse and the political landscape of today has led to “us versus them” sentiments. Government jobs, services and projects are all allocated to local indigenous populations and local governments monopolize resources for local use or charge neighbours for their use. “Outsiders”, the majority of which are migrants that have lived in the area for generations, are being denied access to local resources and territories. And thirdly, under the new framework central government funds for local governments have been reduced significantly, leaving them responsible for procuring most of their own revenue. As a result, there has been a new “resource boom” as regional and village governments rush to convert available natural resource capital into cash. And the new decentralization laws allow for this to take place.

All of these factors combined are having a devastating impact on Indonesia’s natural resources, leading local environmental scientists to warn that this new governmental reform “ could go down as one of those key periods in history where there is a massive loss of forest, such as there was in China in 1958, during the Great Leap Forward” (pg. 624). Thorburn states that though there are rich traditional resource management practices in Indonesia and prior research and literature have suggested that decentralization will lead to greater empowerment, equity, and sustainable use of natural resources, initial evidence since Indonesia’s recent changes indicated that destructive practices are instead rising sharply.

Prepared by Erin Smith

In this article Li, whose research took place in the mountainous interiors and uplands of Indonesia and the Philippines, explores the relationship between the assumptions of community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) and the underlying processes and reality of its implementation in the region. Li argues that the underlying assumptions and “simplification” of CBNRM have led to legal frameworks and program initiatives which make rights conditional upon specific forms of social organization, livelihoods, and conservation outcomes.

The founding assumption of CBNRM is that upland people “by virtue of being natural resource dependent and/or indigenous, either already have, or could be encouraged to adopt sustainable resource management practices”(pg. 267). Additionally, terms and catch phrases commonly associated with CBNRM convey a constant equation between upland resource users and environmental protection. However, it does so without addressing whether the upland communities already have these characteristics or whether they are instead goals or ideals. According to Li, CBNRM uses an “environmental hook” to tie rights to particular forms of identity, social organization, livelihood and resource management. She points out, in support of this statement, that at least half of upland people in the Philippines are migrants of lowland origin. Upland people are diverse and mobile and the extent, to which they form “communities” which are coherent enough to have or develop systems of natural resource management, let alone sustainable and equitable ones, is varied. The factor that all upland people have in common is that they occupy land defined as public domain and have no legally recognized ownership. As a result, their common problem is a legal one, beyond this commonality, Li states their circumstances, needs and interests in conservation vary greatly, making it difficult in practice to identify communities that fit the simplified model presupposed by CBNRM.

Despite this, CBNRM has been implemented by state and governmental policies resulting in highly variable outcomes. While some people have benefited from CBNRM provisions, others have found themselves re-assigned to a marginal economic niche that corresponds poorly to their desired futures. Additionally, rather than reducing official and state interference in local affairs, the author argues that it is a vehicle for realigning the relationship between the state and upland citizens. And contrary to the goal of CBNRM proponents it has intensified state control over upland resources, lives, and livelihoods. She further states that the CBNRM simplification that assumes an inherent separation between community and state and suggests a community is a natural entity outside and/or opposed to state processes is incongruent with the actual process of the state and community in the uplands of Southeast Asia. As a result, the CBNRM advocated throughout the region, is at best a fractional response to the needs of upland peoples.

While the author acknowledges advocates for CBNRM have never claimed it to be a “fit all” solution, she concludes with the argument that CBNRM as it is currently being promoted in Asia is most compatible with isolated, forest-dependent indigenous communities, which are prevalent in the “imagined country” of the uplands but rare in reality. Li further argues that CBNRM anchors legal rights in specific identities or set of practices and attempt to make these conform to “territorial units” such as communities or “bounded groups, with a clear sense of territorial possession” (pg. 268). In the uplands, doing such runs the risk of replicating old discrimination, but in “new, environmental garb”.

Prepared by Erin Smith

Community based natural resource management (CBNRM) is often criticised for its unpredictability, begging the much-asked question: why do some strategies for management perform better than others? Some have answered this question by developing institutional design principles while others have critiqued the underlying assumptions of CBNRM. However, Armitage believes that this question also needs to be addressed by analysing the exogenous and endogenous variables that influence people to act collectively, respond to changing circumstances, build capacity and promote learning for adaptation in management practices. In this article, he draws on examples from Canada and Indonesia to examine the relationship between adaptive capacity, CBNRM success, and the socio-institutional factors that determine collective action. Adaptive capacity is defined by Armitage as the aspect of resource management that reflects learning and an ability to experiment and cultivate innovative solutions in complex and ecological circumstances. In a CBNRM setting this capacity depends on the ability to act collectively in the face of various internal and external threats to the use and protection of common resources.

CBNRM efforts in Nunavut of Northern Canada take place in an institutional and legal framework where the rights and responsibilities of communities and organizations are fairly well defined. With the passing of the Nunavit Final Agreement in 1993, a legal document requiring the development of new forms of collaboration among Inuit communities and government entities in the context of wildlife management and protected areas, community based management efforts have been more formalized and intensified. However, being in the centre of complex and rapidly evolving dynamics of intense resource development and economic growth, the community faces many new external and internal changes that put stress on CBNRM efforts. The North of Canada is the focus of oil and natural gas exploration, mineral extraction, wildlife harvesting, fisheries development, and tourism all totalling billions of dollars and the promise of thousands of jobs. As Armitage states, such changes have a fundamental affect on CBNRM performance because they influence the social processes and institutional forms that shape collective action and the capacity for communities and organizations involved to adapt. Such socio-ecological conditions are not always understood in the design of CBNRM institutions or the discourse within the region.

In Indonesia, institutional and legislative basis for CBNRM is less developed than in Canada. As such, it faces different challenges to adaptive capacity. Unlike Canada, the rights of local communities and indigenous groups in Indonesia to actively participate in the management and protection of resources are not well defined. With recent changes in the government, from central to local, even more uncertainty has arisen around CBNRM, with new laws providing only a rough framework for new management regimes. As such, it is extremely difficult for communities to foster opportunities for collective action. In addition, these changes and uncertainty also undermine long standing traditional resource management institutions, practices and the “collective memory” required for adaptation.

In conclusion, Armitage stresses that a focus on adaptive capacity can help establish where external authorities need to act and where community based organizations should have a lead role. Different players in CBNRM will have different capabilities to adapt to variability and threats in ways that encourage positive outcomes. Highlighting such differences can aid in the development of crucial links, and the elimination of unnecessary links between multilevel governance systems in CBNRM.

Prepared by Erin Smith