In this article Lewis argues for a view of Boas not as opposed to the scientific model exemplified by Darwin and Ernst Mayr, but as applying the principles of evolutionary analysis to the related, if distinct, field of anthropology. In rejecting the search for positive rules characteristic of his own early training in physics, Boas is in fact following Darwin?s lead, in emphasizing the individual and historical, as well as the qualitative, aspects of humanity as a distinct phenomenon requiring its own methodology. The na?ve outsider?s view of science, characteristic of Leslie White, Marvin Harris, et al., overvalues the methodology of physics, regardless of the object of analysis.

The convergence of Boasian method with pragmatism is especially notable. Boas was a close colleague of John Dewey and George Herbert Mead, and shared with them a common philosophical and political agenda. The central tenets of pragmatism?the characteristically American school of philosophy?are antifoundationalism, pluralism and diversity, contingency and chance, and an emphasis on the individual. This follows from key aspects of Darwin?s methodology, while opposing the rationalism and teleology often conflated with ?science? (Spencer, Marx, White). In several important ways the advent of postmodern theories represents a revival of these pragmatic principles.

Boas, far from a collector of random facts, used carefully gathered data to shed light on general phenomena, such as the role of artistic creativity within a defined tradition, and the roles of environment and heredity in cranial development. Although cast in negative terms by Boas himself, in the context of arguments against popular notions derived from racist and ?social Darwinist? thought, in fact such results contribute to positive knowledge and affirm the utility of hypothetico-deductive analysis to cultural, linguistic, and physical anthropological data. Similarly, the collection of individual case studies may shed light on larger processes of historical change, which ultimately may result in the discovery of historical laws and psychological process. However, our degree of confidence in these regularities never can rise to the level we expect in physics; this is the result of the complexity of the human condition. Anthropology, along with biology, but unlike physics, cannot be a predictive science. That limitation, however, does not mean that it is no science at all. Indeed, the ?rediscovery? of Boas by a younger generation of mainly Chicago-trained anthropologists bodes well for the development of a ?post-postmodernist? synthesis in anthropology.
Prepared by: Michael Harkin [MH], Professor of Anthropology, University of Wyoming, July 2006